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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BREITLING BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION INC. ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
UTAH GOLDEN SPIKERS, INC. and 











Case No. 15945 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATE OF UTAH 
I. There was no contract awarded. One of the primary 
issues in this lawsuit is whether a "contract was awaFded" 
by the State of Utah to the Golden Spikers, Inc., as contem-
plated by the bonding statute. Plaintiff's brief does not 
accurately reflect the record on this important point. On 
pages 3 and 4 of Plaintiff's Brief, purporting to be a state-
ment of the facts, Plaintiff infers there was a contract entered 
into between the State of Utah and the Golden Spikers. On 
page 11 of Plaintiff-Respondent's Brief, he states: 
"Plaintiff-Respondent submits that the facts involved 
in this case clearly show that the State of Utah awarded 
to the Golden Spikers a contract to install improve-
ments at the State Fair Grounds ... " 
"The terms of the agreement betwePn th~ St~te of Utah and 
the Golden Spikers are clearly established by the con-
duct of the State of Utah and the Memorandum of the 
l\greernent bct11een the State of Utah and the Golden 
Spikers .•. " 
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Again, on page 12 of Plaintiff's brief, Plaintiff claims 
" ... an express agreement was reached between the State of Utah 
and the Golden Spikers wereby the Golden Spikers were awarded 
a contract to install the soccer field at the State Fair 
grounds." Plaintiff's statements are simply not true and are 
not borne out by the evidence or the Findings of the Court. 
a. Exhibit 1-P not admitted as contract binding State. 
Exhibit l-P, which is the unsigned agreement to which 
Plaintiff refers as setting forth the terms of the agreement 
was admitted by the Court for a very limited purpose only, in 
the following terms: 
"The Court: I thought about 1-P during the noon hour. 
am going to receive it but not as a contract binding the 
State to anything. Just as a document prepared during 
the course of negotiations between the parties here, but 
for that purpose only. Whatever it does or whatever it 
shows that is relevant and material to resolving this 
lawsuit, so be it. I certainly don't think you have 
established it is a contract signed by the Golden Spikers 
and the State, but I will receive 1-P for the purpose of 
showing what has taken place during the negotiations." 
R.l69 
b. Findings state lease never agreed to. The Findings 
of Fact signed by the Judge in pertinent part state: 
"3 ... Such lease agreement was never agreed to or signPd 
by the Utah Golden Spikers, In~--------· 
4. Notwithstanding the lack of a completed lease agree-
ment ... 
. . . A written agreement betlveen the' De par I. men t of r:xpusJ-
tions and the Utah Golden Spikers Inc. was n~vcr finalize 
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8. Notwithstanding the fact that a written contract had 
not ever been executed between the Division of Exposi-
tions, and the Utah Golden Spikers, Inc. for lease of 
the Fair grounds, ... 
9. That after Plaintiff had performed the work at the 
State Fair grounds several soccer games were played and 
contract negotiations continued throughout the summer of 
1976, between the Division of Expositions and the 
Utah Golden Spikers, Inc., but a written contract was 
never finalized ... " 
The Court did not make a Finding that there was a contract 
of any kind between the State and the Golden Spikers. 
c. Exhibit 1-P shows it was not a final agreement. 
Exhibit 1-P itself shows it was intended to be signed by 
both the Budget Officer and the Director of Finance of the 
State of Utah as absolutely required by the applicable statutes, 
63-2-1 and 62-2-2 Utah Code Ann. That neither the Budget 
Officer nor the Director of Finance signed Exhibit 1-P is 
obvious from the exhibit itself. 
d. Testimony shows no agreement. That the State never 
reached an oral agreement is clear from the testimony. When 
asked to identify Exhibit 1-P, Mr. Weilenmann responded: 
"Answer: It is a lease agreement that was one of many 
lease agreements that we talked about entering into, 
none of which were concluded. R.lll 
Question by Mr. McLachlin: Now, Mr. Weilenmann, could we 
characterize these documents as negotiations in prepara-
tion of this agreement that you had with the representa-
tive of the Golden Spikers. 
A. Yes, in preparation for the signing of an acceptable 
agreement with them. That is not the document you 
showed me. 
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Q. was there another document prepared? 
A. Maybe half a dozen or so, none of which was acceptable 
to them." R.ll2 
And again, on cross examination of Mr. Weilenmann by Mr. 
Gibbs, referring to about the time when Mr. Weilenmann signed 
Exhibit 1-P: 
"Q. Do you recall having a conversation at the S~ate Fair 
grounds at or about the time of the signing of that 
agreement by you, with reference to approval of Exhibit 
1-P by the State Board of Examiners? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you tell the Court what that conversation was? 
The Court: Well, let's lay the foundation, 
Q. Do you recall who was present besides yourself, Mr. 
Weilenmann? 
A. Yes. Representatives of the Golden Spikers, Mr. Bring-
hurst, myself and I think a representative of the Attorn~ 
General's office ... 
Q. Would you now tell us what the conversation was? 
A. Yes, I indicated that neither Mr. Bringhurst nor I have 1 
authority to enter into an agreement on behalf of the ~· 
State of Utah; that was required. That would require the 
approval of the :Soard of Examiners. And that is the rei.son 
I was concerned about what is number paragraph 32 in the 
Exhibit; that we already had a contract for the use of 
the coliseum and that we couldn't enter into another 
contract until that first contract had been taken care 
of. Even if when it was taken care of, the Board of 
Examiners, since it involved an active departure from 
a normal procedure, would have to be approved by the 
Board of Examiners. 
Q. Did you ever submit Exhibit 1-P or its original to 
the Board of Examiners? 
A. I am unsure as to whether any was submitted. To the 
best of my knowledge, it was not. 
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Q. Do you know whether or not the Board of Examiners 
ever approved the original of Exhibit 1-P? 
A, I know the Board of Examiners never approved a con-
tract. 
Q. Let me refer you to the next to the last paragraph 
Exhibit 9, which shows a blank signature line for the 
Budget officer of the State. Did you ever submit this 
original 1-P to the Budget office of the State? 
A. I never submitted it to anyone. 
Q. Let me direct you to the Director of Finance, a blank 
line also appears for his approving signature. Did you 
ever submit it to the Director of Finance? 
A. It was never submitted to the Director of Finance. 
It is an incomplete document." R.l20 
Again, on redirect examination by Mr. McLachlin, Mr. 
Weilenmann testified as follows: 
"Q. Mr. Weilenmann, you have testified that the Board of 
Examiners needed to approve this agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. lvhay is that? 
A. Because we had established a rule in the department 
on the advice of the governor when I first became di-
rector of the department, that anytime there was a con-
flict in terms of contract, and/or in terms of expenditure 
of funds, that might be required, or the acceptance of 
funds that were substantial in nature, that the Board of 
Examiners would approve it. 
Q. This was a policy that you had established during your 
administration? 
A. No, it was a policy that Governor Rampton established 
during his administration. R.l21 
Q. Mr. Weilenmann, do you have any knowledge that the 
Golden Spikers did not execute this agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Other than the fact that--Do you have any independent 
knowledge that they did not execute a copy of this agree-
ment? 
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A. Yes, because it would have been my responsibility to 
take the executed copy before the Board of Examiners 
which was never done. 
Q. At least you were never supplied with an executed 
copy; is that correct? 
A. It was my responsibility to take it and I was never 
supplied with such a copy. 
Q. Is that the reason you did not submit this to the 
Board of Examiners? 
A. Yes, because it was never completed. 
Q. Had the Golden Spikers signed this agreement, would 
you have submitted it to the Board of Examiners? 
A. If paragraph 32 had been met. 
I 
Q. What requirement was there in paragraph 32 
to be met before the Golden Spikers signed the 
that needed I 
agreement? 
A. First, Salt Lake City would not renew the business 
license and, secondly, that the contract in existence witl 
the Fairgrounds Speedway could be settled and done away 
with. We couldn't lease the property to two people at 
the same time. 
Q. Doesn't paragraph 32 solely shift the burden of any 
loss resulting from the previous contract to the Golden 
Spikers? 
The Court: You are asking him for a legal conclusion, it 
seems to me, Mr. McLachlin, and the context of the 
paragraph speaks for itself as to what it does. 
Q. (by Mr. McLachlin) Mr. Weilenmann, as a result of yo~ 
signing this agreement, the Utah Golden Spikers were per-
mitted to install the soccer field; is that not correct? 
A. No. 
Q. Why were they permitted to install the soccer field 
then? 
A. Because they had entered on the grounds, destroyed t~ 
speedway so the speedway couldn't operate, and counsel 
advised that we could perhaps negotiate a contract that 
would be satisfactory. 
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Q. A contract between whom? 
A. A contract between the State of Utah, that is the 
Board of Examiners, and the Golden Spikers and the elimina-
tion of the contract that existed between the speedway 
people and the State of Utah, which was then in force." 
R. 122,123 
Mr. Bringhurst testified in answer to the questions of Mr. 
McLachlin with regard to Exhibit 1-P and the execution of an 
agreement for the Golden Spikers as follows: 
"A. Mr. Bringhurst, referring to Exhibit 1-P, does 
your signature appear on Exhibit 1-P? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is your signature on Exhibit 1-P? 
A. Yes, that is only half a document, it has never been 
processed ..• " R.l22 
Q. Do you know what Mr. Weilenmann did with the contract? 
A. It looks like he signed it. 
Q. Do you know what happened to the contract after Mr. 
Weilenmann signed the contract? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know if the contract was ever submitted to the 
Board of Examiners? 
A. No, I am not sure it wasn't. I think if it had of 
been, it would have been processed to the other process, 
the Budget Director, the Finance Director and the other 
things would have been approved first if it had been 
submitted. 
Q. Do you have a copy in your possession that the Golden 
Spikers signed? 
A. No ... 
Q. Isn't it a fact that the Golden Spikers signed this 
agreement on March 31, the same time that you signed the 
agreement? 
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A. Not to my knowledge." 
There was no witness that testified that the Budget 
Director or the Director of Finance ever signed a contract 
with the Golden Spikers. No witness ever testified that 
approval was given by the Board of Examiners as Mr. Weilenmann 
testified would have to be the case. No one testified that the 
1 
Golden Spikers ever signed the contract. 
On this state of the record, it is outrageous to either 
infer or claim a contract was entered into between the State 
and the Golden Spikers. 
2. No contract should be "implied in fact." 
Plaintiff claims on pages 12 and 13 of his Brief that a 
contract should be implied in fact because a written agreement 
was prepared even though not executed by the parties. 
a. Conditions precedent not met. As Mr. We~lenmann's i 
testimony shows, he advised the Golden Spiker representatives 
that any agreement would have to be approved by the Board of 
Examiners. He made this a "condition precedent" to the agree-
ment to the state becoming bound. It is hornbook law that a 
condition precedent must be met. See 17 AmJur Contracts §71. 
The statutory requirements that the Budget Director and the 
Director of Finance sign the agreement before the State is 
bound are also conditions precedent which were never met. 
b. Contract negotiations continued. t1r. Weilenmann', 
testimony set out above also shows that contract negotiations 
continued with the Golden Spikers long after Plaintiff had 
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completed his work. Such negotiations are inconsistent with 
Plaintiff's claim that a contract could be implied in fact from 
the actions of the parties. 
c. Statute of Frauds requires writing. Paragraph 
19 of Exhibit 1-P which provides for an initial lease term 
of 5 years, brings the entire lease contract within the purview 
of the Statute of Frauds, and is therefore required to be 
in writing. Section 25-5-1,3 UCA 1953. 
d. Reason for not submitting to Finance. Plaintiff 
infers the reason Mr. Weilenmann never presented the contract 
to either the Budget Director, the Director of Finance, or 
the Board of Examiners is because he thought the contract was 
already operative. A much more persuasive reason is that 
given by Mr. Weilenmann. The Golden Spikers never ag~eed to 
or signed the contract and therefore, the contract was not 
in form to be presented to the Budget Director, the Director 
of Finance and the Board of Examiners. 
e. Request of permission to start. Plaintiff also 
claims as evidence that a contract existed is the fact the 
Spikers on or about the day Exhibit 1-P was signed asked Mr. 
Bringhurst for something in writing so they could begin. Mr. 
Bringhurst told them "no" he was not authorized to give them 
that permission" R.l58. The only reasonable conclusion is 
that Mr. Bringhurst at this point in time did not believe there 
was a contract and could not allow them to proceed until such 
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time as there was a contract. The fact that the Golden 
Spikers then immediately directed a contractor to break 
the fence down and tear up part of the race track without 
the knowledge of any of the officers of the State should 
not be held against the State. 
f. Rice v Granite case. On page 13 of Plaintiff's 
Brief, he claims the State is estopped from denying the 
existence of a contract between the State and the Golden 
Spikers and in support thereof, cites the case of Rice v 
Granite School District, 23 Ut.2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969). 
In the Rice case, the action was for injuries sustained when 
the Plaintiff, while attending a high school football game, 
fell from a bleacher claimed to be negligently maintained 
by the Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismis? on 
the grounds the Plaintiff's claim was barred by the one year 
limitation period provided in the governmental immunity act. 
Plaintiff filed an affidavit in opposition to Defendant's 
motion. The Court treated the matter as a motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed the complaint with prejudice as not 
being timely brought. On appeal, the Plaintiff contended 
that her affidavit contained sufficient facts to create an 
estoppel which she was entitled to present to the jury. The 
facts claimed under the estoppel were that the insurance 
adjuster who represented the insurance company for the high 
school misled the Plaintiff by advising her she would be 
compensated for her injury as soon as the costs were 
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ascertained. The Court held that the insurance carrier 
held a peculiar status under the governmental immunity act 
in that an insurance carrier is specifically authorized to 
approve or deny a claim and therefor the acts of the insurance 
carrier could bring about an estoppel. The Court cautioned 
against likening the results of the Rice case to a case like 
we have presented here, where Mr. Bringhurst or Mr. Weilenmann, 
as agents for the State, are not authorized by statute to 
bind the State. The Court makes this distinction in the 
following language found on page 25: 
"Implicit within the statutory designation of the 
insurance carrier to deal directly with the claimant 
is the acknowledgement that the insurance carrier's 
conduct may be such as to support an estoppel. The 
insurance carrier is specifically authorized to approve 
or deny claims; therefore, we are not confronted by a 
fact situation wherein the agent's actions were not 
authorized by statute and the governmental entity could 
not be estopped to assert the statute of limitations." 
The inference of the Rice case is that an agent of the State 
who can bind the State can take the necessary action to create 
an estoppel. This is consistent with the overwhelming weight 
of case authority as cited in the State's earlier Brief. 
3. More than lease agreement required. 
Plaintiff on page 9 of his Brief claims advantage from 
the fact that the Division of Expositions without approval of 
t.he Director of Finance has authority to lease property of 
the State Fair as provided by 64-4-7.5 UCA 1953. Plaintiff's 
position is not applicable to his needs nor supported by the 
facts. As earlier discussed, Mr. Weilenmann made approval of 
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the Board of Examiners a condition precedent to the State 
being bound and Exhibit 1-P itself makes clear it was to 
be signed by both the Budget Director and the Director of 
Finance and this certainly gave notice of the fact to the 
Spikers, making this a condition precedent. The evidence also 
shows without contradiction that the Golden Spikers did not 
execute the contract. The fact that space was left for the 
Spikers signature is evidence from which it can be concluded 
a signature was necessary to manifest the Spikers were bound. 
Further, the fact that Mr. Weilenmann testified many contract 
drafts were prepared and negotiated after Exhibit 1-P was 
signed by Mr. Bringhurst and Mr. Weilenmann shows neither 
the Spikers nor the State intended to be bound by the terms 
of Exhibit 1-P as Plaintiff contends. 
If Exhibit 1-P is not considered as anything more than 
a lease agreement as Plaintiff contends, which could be 
properly executed by the Director of the Division of Expo-
sitions without approval of the Director of Finance, where 
does the "award of a contract for improvements" which gives 
rise to the application of the bonding statute come from? 
If Plaintiff views the relationship oi Lhe State to the 
Spikers as one of a lease only, then Plaintiff must look only 
to the lease interest conveyed to the Golden Spikers onto whi~ 
he can attach his lien rights. Plaintiff, of course, makes 
no claim there are any rights presently owned by thP Spiker5 
on which he can claim lien rights. 
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4. Not Attorney General Recommendation. 
On page 5, Plaintiff contends that the construction work 
for installation of the soccer field was allowed to continue 
on advice from the Attorney General's office. This is an 
unfair inference from the evidence. Mr. Weilenmann testified 
that it was the attorney's opinion that a contract could 
be negotiated, and based on this opinion and "on his own," 
he determined to allow the work to continue. R.ll5. 11r. 
Bringhurst specifically testified that no one from the Attorney 
General's office recommended that the Golden Spikers be 
allowed to continue with the improvements or destruction of 
the grandstand area. R.l90. 
5. No unauthorized expenditure claim. 
Plaintiff makes an interesting, although inconsistent 
argument on page 15 of his Brief. Plaintiff states: 
"In the instant case, there is absolutely no evidence 
that the State of Utah was obligated to make expenditures 
under its agreement with the Golden Spikers. To the 
contrary, under its agreement with the Golden Spikers, 
the State of Utah contemplated receiving an income had 
its venture with the Golden Spikers been successful. 
The judgment of the trial court does not represent 
unauthorized expenditures for services and supplies, it 
represents a liability imposed against the State of Utah 
as a result of its failure to obtain the delivery of a 
payment bond from the Golden Spikers as required by 
Section 14-1-5, Utah Code Ann 1953 as amended." 
If there was no "contract for the construction of an 
imrrovement" or no "contract amount" in ·Lhe contract claimed 
hrtween the State and the Golden SpikerH, th8re is no appli-
cation of the bond act and no bond required. The bond act 
in pertinent part states: 
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"Before any contract for the construction ... of ... any ... 
improvement of the State of Utah ... is awarded to any 
person, he shall furnish to the State of Utah ... bonds 
which shall become binding upon the award of the con-
tract to such person ... 
(2) A payment bond in an amount to be fixed by the con-
tracting body but in no event less than 50% of the con-
tract amount ... provided for in such contract." 
Clearly, the contract claimed by Plaintiff represents an expen- · 
diture by the State which was neither budgeted or approved as 
required by law. 
6. Quantum l•1erui t Argument. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Wilson v Salt Lake City, 52 
Ut.506, 174 P.B47 as supporting his position. The Wilson 
case does not deal with the issues here presented. The legis-
lature has set up exact procedures for expenditure of State 
funds for improvements such as are claimed here. These 
include approval of the Budget Officer, the Finance Director 
and calling for bids. Salt Lake City had no such requirements. 
This Court has never ruled on the issue presented in this case., 
7. Conclusions. 
Without supportive Findings or elaborating on the reasons,! 
the trial court found the State liable under the bonding act 
and for unjust enrichment. 
Implicit to liability under the bonding statute is a 
Finding there was a contract between the State through an 
authorized agent representing the State, who followed State 
requirements as the "owner" on the one hand, and the Golden 
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Spikers as a "contractor" on the other hand, fixing a "contract 
amount" for construction of the improvements specified, from 
which contract amount the amount of the bond is fixed. The 
bonding statute is bottomed on the idea of agreement or 
contract. Without an agreement or contract, the bonding 
statute does not apply. No case is cited by Plaintiff finding 
liability under any bonding statute based on "implied contract" 
or any of the other equitable estoppel-like remedies. These 
equitable remedies do not operate through the bonding statute. 
There is no evidence in this case that an agreement was ever 
reached so as to bring into play the bonding statute, through 
which the Plaintiff, who contracted with the Golden Spikers, 
can indirectly claim liability. 
The evidence shows no contract should be implied~in-fact 
and this claim of Plaintiff should be rejected on the evidence. 
Plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment is not so easily 
disposed of because this Court has never ruled on the under-
lying issues of law. 
The State submits there are three issues raised in this 
appeal that this Court should decide. 
l. Does a claim for unjust enrichment against ~he State 
fall within an exception to the Governmental Immunities Act? 
2. Can a claim for unjust enrichment, based on estoppel 
because of acts of a State employee not authorized to bfnd the 
State, supercede the express requirements of 63-2-l, 63-2-2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-16-
and 64-1-4, requiring approval by the Budget Officer, the 
Finance Director and appropriate bidding procedures? 
3. If unjust enrichment is allowed, is the measure of 
damages the benefit to the State or the detriment to the 
provider? 
The answers to these questions are necessary not only 
to decide this case, but also to determine the action the State 
should take in other similar actions now pending as a result 
of the State's involvement with the Golden Spikers. 
The State submits that for the reasons given in its 
first brief and in harmony with the overwhelming majority of 
American Courts who have considered these issues, the Trial 
Court should be reversed. If the Plaintiff wishes to recapture 
his fill material and top soil, the State has no objection. 
Respectfully submitted, 
vU~ ~ 
lvilliam G. Gc;Jb;~ I 
Special Assistant Attorney Genera:! 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant ! 
State of Utah I 
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